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Abstract
Characteristics models have been found to be useful in many areas of
economics. However, their empirical implementation tends to rely heav-
ily on functional form assumptions. In this paper we develop a revealed
preference approach to characteristics models. We derive the necessary
and su¢ cient empirical conditions under which data on the market behav-
iour of heterogeneous, price-taking consumers are nonparametrically con-
sistent with the consumer characteristics model. Where these conditions
hold, we show how information may be recovered on individual consumers
marginal valuations of product attributes. In some cases marginal valua-
tions are point identied and in other cases we can only recover bounds.
Where the conditions fail we highlight the role which the introduction of
unobserved product attributes can play in rationalising the data. We im-
plement these ideas using consumer panel data on the Danish milk market.
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1 Introduction
The idea that consumers have preferences over the characteristics of market
goods, as developed by Gorman (1956), Lancaster (1966), Muellbauer (1974)
and Rosen (1974), has turned out to be an extremely fruitful one. For ex-
ample, it is central to much applied microeconomic work on price indices (for
example, Stone (1956) as an early example), quality change (Griliches (1971)),
location decisions (Tinbergen (1959)), labour market allocation (Heckman and
Scheinkman (1987)), nance (Markowitz (1959)) and the analysis of markets
for di¤erentiated products (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)). However, the
empirical implementation of characteristics models tends to rely heavily on func-
tional form assumptions. In this paper we develop a revealed preference1 (non-
parametric) approach to the empirical analysis of characteristics models. We
derive the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which data on the market
behaviour of heterogeneous and price-taking consumers are nonparametrically
consistent with the consumer characteristics model. Where the conditions fail
we highlight the role which the introduction of unobserved product attributes
can play in rationalising the data. Where these conditions hold, we show how
information may be recovered on individual consumers marginal valuations of
product attributes. In some cases marginal valuations are point identied and
in other cases we can only recover bounds.
We apply the revealed preference techniques we develop to consumer panel
data on the Danish milk market. The two major characteristics that vary across
di¤erent types of milk are fat content and whether it is produced under organic
conditions. Both aspects are important for substantive issues. Given the con-
cern over increasing obesity in all high income countries there is interest in
identifying the marginal valuation of fat and how this is distributed across the
population. Our techniques allow us to identify the distribution of these valu-
ations. As regards the second characteristic, organic, interest here centres on
how much extra consumers are willing to pay for milk that is arguably more
healthy (for example, because cows that produce organic milk are never treated
with antibiotics) and increases animal welfare. Given that organic milk is more
expensive to produce it is important to establish the demand so that farmers or
milk marketing boards can assess the demand for organic milk. In this analy-
sis we use data which allows us to follow individual households over very long
periods so that we can deal with heterogeneity in a fully nonparametric way by
treating each household as an individual time series. We nd that the demand
paths of a majority of households can be rationalised by a linear characteristics
model dened over three attributes. We show that the distribution of prefer-
ences over characteristics is multi-modal, suggesting the existence of distinct
types of consumers.
1See Samuelson (1948), Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972),
Diewert (1973), Diewert and Parkan (1978) and Varian (1982, 1983, 1984).
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2 Revealed preference conditions for the char-
acteristics model
2.1 The Afriat-Varian conditions.
We rst present the usual revealed preference (RP) conditions for the standard
model in which agents have directpreferences over market goods. Let qt be a
(K  1) vector of quantities of market goods bought in period t at market prices
pt. Given a data set fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T , we ask when these data be rationalised by
a utility function, in the following sense:
Denition 1 A utility function u (q) q-rationalises the data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T if
u (qt)  u (q) for all q such that p0tqt  p0tq.
The standard results (see Varian (1982) for the denition of GARP) are the
classic Afriat-Varian conditions:
Afriats Theorem2 . The following statements are equivalent:
1. there exists a utility function u (q) which is continuous, non-satiated and
concave which q-rationalises the data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T .
2. there exist numbers fUt; t > 0gt=1;:::;T such that
Us  Ut + tp0t (qs   qt) 8 s; t = 1; :::; T
3. the data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T satisfy the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference
(GARP).
These conditions have been applied to aggregate time series data (see, for ex-
ample, Varian (1982)) and (less frequently) to household data (see Blundell,
Browning and Crawford (2003)).
2.2 RP conditions for the characteristics model.
The characteristics model posits that rather than having preferences over market
goods directly, agents have preferences over the characteristics or attributes that
these goods embody. The transformation from aK-vector of market goods, q, to
a J-vector of characteristics, z, is given by the mapping z = F (q). Preferences
are then dened over characteristics v (z). This gives a derived utility function
over market goods u (q) = v (F (q)). The consumer choice model for given
prices p and outlay x is:
max
q
v (z) subject to z = F (q) and p0q  x;q  0
This model takes prices as given for individual agents and we follow this treat-
ment in this paper. Thus we adopt the Muellbauer (1974) and Gorman (1954)
tradition of focusing on the demand side, and abstract from any supply side
simultaneity issues (Rosen (1974)). The most widely analysed and applied ver-
sion of the consumer characteristics model is one in which characteristics are a
linear function of the demands for market goods. That is z = A0q where A is
2Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), Varian (1982).
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(K  J) matrix of constants with J  K and A has full column rank. The tech-
nology matrix A records the amounts of each of the characteristics present in
one unit of each of the market goods. In this paper we concentrate on this linear
version of model but note that most of what follows also applies to non-linear
characteristics with concave technologies.
Our initial focus is on the circumstances under which data can be nonpara-
metrically rationalised by this model. In this context the term rationalise is
dened as follows:
Denition 2 A utility function v (z) z-rationalises the data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T for
the technology A if v (zt) = v (A0qt)  v (z) for all z such that z = A0q and
p0tqt  p0tq.
This states that a utility function rationalises observed choices if it assigns an
equal or higher value to those bundles of characteristics which the consumer
chooses, than it does to those alternative bundles of characteristics which could
have feasibly been produced from a¤ordable bundles of market goods. If a
utility function z-rationalises the data, this means that were it plugged into
the consumers maximisation problem set out above, then it would perfectly
generate the observed data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T for the posited technology A.
For a good, k, which is purchased, the rst order condition from the lin-
ear characteristics model gives the following characterisation of its price as a
weighted sum of the shadow prices of its characteristics:
pkt = akt =
XJ
j=1
akjjt (1)
where ak denotes the kth row of A and:
t = (t)
 1rv (zt)
Thus the shadow price of a characteristic is dened as its marginal utility nor-
malised by the marginal utility of total expenditure (t) (see Gorman (1956),
equation (5)). That the market price of a good that is bought can be viewed
as a linear combination of the underlying shadow prices is the most important
feature of characteristics models. If good k is not bought then we have the
inequality:
pkt  akt (2)
so that the market price is too high relative to the subjective valuation of the
embodied attributes.
The key to deriving necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the characteristics
model can be shown in a simple gure. In Figure 1 we present a graphical three
good, two attribute illustration of the revealed preference conditions. Initially
the agent faces the constraints given by the kite shape dened by solid lines and
chooses point A at which she is consuming goods 1 and 2. Suppose now that
the price of good 1 falls and the price of good 3 rises, so that she now faces the
dotted constraint set. If she now switches to buying some of good 3 and none
of good 1 then we cannot rationalise her choices with convex preferences. If, on
the other hand, she continues to buy both of goods 1 and 2, or even only one of
them, we can nd indi¤erence curves that rationalise the choices. Our task in
now to extend this insight into feasible testable conditions for several goods and
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characteristics. The next theorem gives the necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for the characteristics model3 .
conditions
1:pdf
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A second period choice along
here rejects RP condition
A
Figure 1: Revealed preference for characteristics
Theorem 1 The following statements are equivalent.
(P ) there exists a utility function v (z) which is non-satiated, continuous and
concave in characteristics which z-rationalises the data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T for given
A.
(A) there exist numbers fVt; t > 0gt=1;:::;T and vectors ftgt=1;::;T such that
Vs  Vt + t0t (A0qs  A0qt) ; 8 s; t (A1)
pt  At; 8t (A2)
(pt  At) qt = 0; 8t (A3)
(L) there exist numbers fWt; t  1; gt=1;:::;T and vectors ftgt=1;::;T such that
Ws  Wt + 0t (A0qs  A0qt) ; 8 s; t (L1)
tpt  At; 8t (L2)
(tpt  At) qt = 0; 8t (L3)
(G) the data ft;A0qtgt=1;:::;T pass GARP for some choice of t such that (A2)
and (A3) are satised.
Conditions A2 and A3 impose the linear pricing condition (1). Conditions (A)
and (G) are the characteristics model analogues of the conditions in Afriats
Theorem. However, both present practical di¢ culties for testing. Condition
3The symbol  denotes the Hardamard product (element-by-element multiplication) of
two vectors or matrices of the same dimension; that is (a; b) (c; d) = (ac; bd).
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(G) requires that we rst nd the shadow prices in order to implement a GARP
test and there is no known general algorithm to do this in a nite number of
steps4 . Condition (A) involves both non-linear functions of unknowns (the t0t
terms) and strict inequality constraints on unknowns (t > 0). We have there-
fore included condition (L) since this condition is in the form of the restrictions
in a linear programming problem. Consequently we can simply employ standard
linear programming techniques to nd, in a nite number of steps, whether there
exists a feasible set of unknowns which satisfy these constraints (the rst step
of all linear programming algorithms). Nevertheless, whilst this approach will
always give a result in a nite number of steps, for even moderate sized prob-
lems this quickly leads to a large dimension problem since we have T (J + 2)
unknowns, T (T   1) + T (K + J) inequality constraints and TK equality con-
straints. Given this, it is convenient to derive a simple necessary condition for
z -rationalisation; this will also be useful in the next subsections.
2.3 A necessary condition for z-rationalisation.
Denote the sub-vector of period t prices for which demands are positive as p+t ;
and let A+t be corresponding sub-matrix of A (with p
0
t and A
0
t denoting the
complementary sub-vectors and sub-matrices for goods for which demands are
zero)5 . Any set of shadow price vectors that satisfy A2 and A3 must have:
p+t = A
+
t t
A necessary condition6 for this system of equations to have a solution is that:
rank(A+t s p
+
t ) = rank
 
A+t

where the s symbol denotes horizontal concantenation. of the matrix A+t with
the extra column p+t . If this rank condition holds then a solution for the shadow
prices will be given by:
t =

A+t
 1
p+t
where the operator [X] 1 denotes the generalised (Moore-Penrose) inverse of
the not-necessarily-square matrix X. These rank conditions are very easy to
check and if they fail for some t then we know that the data can never satisfy
A2 and A3. Note, however, that these conditions are only necessary7 and even
if they hold we may not be able to nd shadow prices that satisfy:
p0t  A0tt
The rank conditions are particularly useful if rank
 
A+t

= J since then we can
solve uniquely for the shadow price vectors. If this holds in every period, then
4The computational problem is akin to that encountered in revealed preference tests of
weak functional separability (see Varian (1983)). See below for a discussion of the particular
circumstances under which the t vectors may be recovered uniquely.
5The t subscript on A+t and A
0
t reects the fact the pattern of goods purchased can vary
from period to period.
6See for example, Magnus and Neudecker, (1991), pp.36-37, Theorem 11.
7Another necessary, but not su¢ cient condition is that the data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T satises
GARP. The conditions in Theorem 1 imply this, but are not implied by it. See Corollary 1
below.
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we can use GARP and condition (G) for testing which is computationally very
rapid. Finally we note that since the characteristics model with J < K is just
a special case of the standard model z-rationalisation implies q-rationalisation.
Formally:
Corollary 1 If there exists a concave utility function v (z) with z = A0q which
z-rationalises the data then there exists a concave utility function u (q) which
q-rationalises the data.
To summarise, Theorem 1 provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for z-
rationalisation which are computationally feasible and indeed straightforward to
check. If a given data set and technology matrix satises these conditions then
there exists at least one utility function, dened over characteristics, which when
plugged into the consumers optimisation problem will generate the observed
data without error.
2.4 Missing prices.
Thus far we have assumed that the researcher always observes the price of all
goods, even of those goods that the consumer does not buy in a particular period.
For some data structures this is not the case and we only observe prices the agent
faced (or can construct unit values) for goods that are bought. One possible
procedure is to impute the missing prices, perhaps by taking the prices paid
by other consumers in the same region and period. Another is to use suitable
published price indices. The problem with any such imputation is that we can
never know how much the outcome of the test depends on the imputation. An
alternative procedure is to include the missing prices as unknowns and search
for values so that the constructed data satisfy the conditions. Since we can
always implicitly set the prices of the goods which are not bought very high,
this obviously makes it easier to satisfy the conditions and so the resulting test
will be weaker in this sense.
We adopt the same notation as the last subsection with p+t for the prices of
the goods bought in period t; p0t for the prices not observed in period t (since
these goods were not bought) and pt =

p+t ;p
0
t
	
arranged in the correct order.
Formally we have the following Afriat conditions for the characteristics model
with missing prices:
Theorem 2 The following statements are equivalent:
(P ) there exists a utility function v (z) which is non-satiated, continuous and
concave in characteristics and there exist prices

p0t
	
t=1;:::;T
which z-rationalise
the data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T for given A.
(A) there exist numbers fVt; t > 0gt=1;:::;T and vectors ftgt=1;::;T such that
Vs  Vt + t0t (A0qs  A0qt) ; 8 s; t
p+t = A
+
t t; 8t
(L) there exist numbers fWt; t  1; gt=1;:::;T and vectors ftgt=1;::;T such that
Ws  Wt + 0t (A0qs  A0qt) ; 8 s; t
tp
+
t  A+t t; 8t
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These conditions are identical to, for example, those in conditions (A) and (L)
in Theorem 1, except that they do not involve the unobserved prices. Once
again we give the standard version of the condition and the linear programming
form which is relatively easy to check. The test given in this theorem is weaker
than the tests given in the Theorem 1 in the sense that passing the test on data
in which all prices are observed (even if some quantities are zero) implies the
conditions in this theorem, but not the other way around. If these conditions
hold then we can take any set of implied ts and ts and simply set:
p0t = tA
0
tt
(which satises (L3) in Theorem 1). In this case the resulting p0t vectors have the
interpretation of being virtual market prices; that is, at these prices consumers
are just on the verge of buying market goods that they did not buy in period t. If
the ts and the t are not unique, these values will not be uniquely determined
either. Note that we also have the corollary (paralleling Corollary 1) that if there
exists a data consistent utility function dened over characteristics and virtual
prices, then there also exists a data consistent utility function over market goods.
Corollary 2 If there exists a concave utility function v (z) with z = A0q and
virtual prices

p0t
	
t=1;:::;T
which z-rationalise the data

p+t ;qt
	
t=1;:::;T
then
there also exists a concave utility function u (q) and virtual prices

p0t
	
t=1;:::;T
which q-rationalise the data.
To conclude this section we note that in the presence of missing prices the
linear programming condition seems to have a clear advantage over the GARP
condition. Firstly they still require the necessary condition rank
 
A+t s p
+
t

=
rank
 
A+t

, so that we can reject z-rationalisation, even with missing prices
should we nd that rank
 
A+t s p
+
t

> rank
 
A+t

. Furthermore (as pointed
out by Varian (1988)) GARP-type tests are generally ruled out by missing price
data because inner products such as p0tqs can involve missing prices; for exam-
ple, if the price of the kth good is not observed in period t because it wasnt
purchased, but good k was purchased in period s. However, the framework
described in Theorem 2 can be easily adapted to testing for q-rationalisation
when there are missing prices by simply replacing A with the identity matrix
IK . This then provides a weaker test of GARP/q-rationalisation in the presence
of missing price data in the same sense that Theorem 2 provides a weaker test
of the characteristics model than is given in Theorem 1.
3 Latent characteristics.
3.1 All goods bought.
In all of the above we have assumed that we observe all of the characteristics
of any good that is bought. In practice this is often not the case. The leading
example is when goods di¤er in qualityand this is not recorded, even though
it might be reected in the market price. Suppose we have some data in which
all goods are bought in each period and all prices are observed. Suppose that
the data satises the q-rationalisation conditions but not the z -rationalisation
conditions for a givenA. One possible reaction is to seek an alternativeAmatrix
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which has rank less than K and does z -rationalise the data.8 . If, however, we
really do believe that the characteristics given by A are objects of preferences
(but not the full set) then a more natural procedure is to seek a supplementary
set of unobserved characteristics that do z -rationalise the data in conjunction
with the observed ones. Given a K  H matrix B, denote this augmented
technology matrix by the K  (J + T ) matrix ~A = A s B. We denote the
K  T matrix of horizontally concatenated price vectors by P. The following
gives a useful result:
Lemma 1 The following statements are equivalent:
1) the data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T satisfy the conditions for q-rationalisation and
rank(eA s P) = rank(eA) for all t
2) the data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T and the augmented matrix eA satisfy the conditions
for z-rationalisation.
This is just a special case of Theorem 1 in which (A2) holds with equality
(since all goods are bought). Given data which satises the q-rationalisation
conditions the issue is then one of nding suitable supplementary characteristics
so that the rank condition holds.
Theorem 3 If the data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T satisfy the conditions for q-rationalisation,
but not the conditions for z-rationalisation given A; then we can always nd an
augmented matrix eA = A s B so that the data do z-rationalise given the aug-
mented matrix eA where B has rank greater than or equal to H  rank(A s
P)  rank(A).
The matrixA s P has J+T columns. If we have a large number of time periods
relative to the number of market goods (T  K) then we shall generally have
rank(A s P) = K so that the number of latent characteristics, H, is equal to
the number of goods minus the number of observed characteristics (K   J). In
this case any KH matrix B that is orthogonal to A will serve to z -rationalise
the data with A s B. One way of nding B is to regress P on A:
P
(KT )
= A
(KJ)(JT )
+ E
(KT )
Then take the estimated residual matrix E^ and nd a K  H matrix B that
forms a column basis for E, which we can do using, for example, principal
components.
Two other special cases of an augmented characteristics matrix, where B
is not restricted to be K  H, have been used in the literature. The rst
option is to add a set of product-specic dummy characteristics to the existing
set of characteristics as discussed in Gorman (1956) and Pudney (1981). This
approach sets B  IK and B  E. Thus:
eA = [A s IK ]
(K[J+K])
e
([J+K]T )
=


E

and et =  tet

([J+K]1)
8The restriction rank (A) < K is because we can always nd a trivial characteristics
model with rank (A) = K by taking A = IK .
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where et and et represent column t of e and E etc.). Obviously this augmented
model achieves the required rank condition by greatly expanding the number of
characteristics to J + K. Thus Gorman suggests that the new characteristics
should be made small. The second representation of essentially the same model
is to add a single time-varying unobserved characteristic to the A matrix; this
is widely used in the empirical IO literature9 . This approach sets B  E and
B  IT . Thus:
eA = [A s E]
(K[J+K])
e
([J+K]T )
=


IT

(3)
Alternatively, we can think of this as a time varying technology where
pt = eAt et
and eAt = [A s et]
(K[J+1])
and et =  t1

([J+1]1)
Obviously the informational content of these three approaches is identical, and
only di¤er in the way E is partitioned into additional characteristics and their
marginal valuations. Note that E itself is not identied by anything other
than the initial method of choosing . In the rst we want to add as few extra
characteristics as possible so we makeB a column basis forE. ObviouslyB is not
unique. The second introduces K market-good-specic dummy characteristics
with corresponding marginal valuations given by E. The third introduces a new
time-varying characteristic which has a marginal valuation of unity in every
period.
The last two suggestions discussed above yield essentially trivial charac-
teristics models in the sense that they have at least as many characteristics as
market goods. Only in the rst may we be able to nd a non-trivial charac-
teristics model with fewer characteristics than goods would t the data (i.e.
where J + H < K). So far we have assumed that the prices of all goods are
observed, even the prices of goods which are not purchased. We now relax this
assumption.
3.2 Zeros in some periods.
The simplest extension is ask whether there is any vector b that we can con-
catenate to A such that we can z-rationalise the data for eA = A s b. This is
equivalent to searching for one unobserved characterisitic. A natural interpreta-
tion of this additional latent attribute is that it represents quality. More gen-
erally, we could search for a (K H) matrix B such that we can z-rationalise
the data for eA = A s B. As before, to give a non-trivial model we require
J + H < K. Conceptually this is straightforward: we simply replace A witheA = A s B in Theorem 2 and add B to the list of unknowns. Unfortunately
the resulting problem no longer has a set of constraints that is linear in the
unknowns so we cannot use standard linear programming techniques to ensure
the existence or non-existence of such a set of parameters. Instead we have to
9For example Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes, (1995).
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use a nonlinear optimisation approach. To provide the constraint we use the
maximum Afriat E¢ ciency10 function, emax (:), which maps from the observed
data to [0; 1]. This is the value such the revealed preference conditions, allowing
for some ine¢ ciency in buying, satisfy GARP; a value of 1 means that the data
passes GARP and all data passes GARP for a value of zero. The following
problem will have a solution at zero if there exists a matrix B which satises
z-rationalisation
Algorithm 1 minB f (B) = (1  emax (;Z)) where the tth column of  is
t =

A+t s B
+
t
 1
p+t and Z = [A s B]
0
Q where Q is the the (K  T ) matrix
of horizontally concatenated quantity vectors.
This algorithm is straightforward to implement using standard nonlinear op-
timisation methods. It starts with an initial guess at B, computes (;Z) as
described and then computes the Afriat e¢ ciency parameter at which the data
(;Z) pass GARP. If emax (;Z) < 1 then f (B) > 0 and B is then altered
on the basis of numerically computed gradients with respect to the objective
function in order to minimise f (B). We have the following result.
Theorem 4 If Problem 1 has a solution at f (B) = 0 then there exists at least
one suitable B matrix such that the data fpt;qtg and the augmented technology
matrix eA = A s B satisfy z-rationalisation.
Finally we consider the case in which no characteristics are observed at all. This
is equivalent to having an unknown transformation matrix A. In such a case
we may wish to test whether there is any linear characteristics model with a
given rank J < K that could be z -rationalisable with some given data. The
approach laid out in Problem 1 and Theorem 4 still applies - suitably adapted
with eA = B for example. Note, however, that even for medium sized data sets
this a largenonlinear problem which can take signicant time.
4 Application
4.1 The data
In this section we apply some of the ideas outlined above to data on purchases
of (cows) milk in a Danish consumer panel. The data cover 2; 500 households
during 1999 and 2000; these households comprise all types ranging from young
singles to couples with children to elderly couples. The sample is representative
of the Danish population (the round number of 2; 500 households is a coinci-
dence). Over the two years, each household keeps a strict record of everything
they buy in each shopping trip; this is done by the use of home scanners which
record price, quantity, the characteristics of the good, the store used etc.. We
aggregate the milk records to a monthly level, partly to minimise the computa-
tional burden and partly to allow us to treat milk as a non-durable, non-storable
good, so that the intertemporally separable model which we are testing is appro-
priate. Thus for each month we have the quantity and expenditure for each type
of milk; from this we construct a unit value for any milk bought as the monthly
expenditure divided by the monthly quantity. Since we cannot construct a unit
10See Afriat. S. N. (1973) and the Appendix for a brief discussion.
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value for a type that is not bought we are in the missing price context discussed
in subsection 2:4.
We concentrate on the 6 main types of milk which di¤er according to fat
content (0:1% (skimmed), 1:5% (semi-skimmed) and 3:5% (full-fat)) and conven-
tional/organic production methods11 . Organic milk is produced under strictly
supervised conditions that are meant to better for the cows and to produce more
healthy milk (for example, antibiotics cannot be used for organicherds). Table
1 below shows the market shares by value and volume of these six types in our
data. Overall conventional milk commanded the majority of the market with
a share of about 75% on both measures, and semi-skimmed milk is the most
popular type by fat content with nearly 60% of the market by both measures.
This is mainly due to the pattern of conventional milk sales; within the organic
segment of the market, skimmed and semi-skimmed have equal shares.
Table 1. Market shares
Market share (%) Conventional milk Organic milk
3:5% 1:5% 0:1% 3:5% 1:5% 0:1%
By value 14:68 45:79 14:16 4:00 10:72 10:64
By volume 13:65 49:26 15:54 3:03 9:16 9:36
Table 2 gives some descriptive statistics on the prices of the di¤erent types of
milk in Danish kroner (DKK) per litre (very approximately, 8 DKK equals one
Euro or $1.30 US). Organic milk is more expensive than conventionally produced
milk by roughly 1:20 DKK/litre, and within the organic/conventional split there
is a clear gradient with respect to fat content: the higher the fat content the
higher the price with a price di¤erence of roughly 1 DKK/litre between full-fat
and skimmed milk.
Table 2. Prices
Prices (DKK/litre) Conventional milk Organic milk
3:5% 1:5% 0:1% 3:5% 1:5% 0:1%
Mean 6:11 5:34 5:09 7:34 6:51 6:30
Median 6:00 5:30 5:00 7:31 6:50 6:27
Std. Dev. 0:62 0:56 0:31 0:38 0:33 0:23
Coe¤ of variation 0:10 0:10 0:06 0:05 0:05 0:04
We treat preferences over milk characteristics as being a separable group
from all other characteristics. This is a questionable assumption since the fat
that is contained in milk is also to be found in other products such as butter
and cheese. If we drop separability then we are left with an impossibly wide
problem (hundreds of goods and dozens of characteristics); in this respect it
would be highly desirable to extend revealed preference tests to latent separa-
bility (see Crawford (2004) and Blundell and Robin (2000)). The corresponding
characteristics model has K = 6 market goods, and J = 3 characteristics:
11We drop speciality milks such as buttermilk and chocolate milks. Note too that container
size may be a relevant priced characteristic. In what follows we do not consider container
size for simplicity, but we note that container size and bulk discounting could be incorporated
into our approach by dening milks sold in containers of di¤erent volumes as di¤erent market
goods and by including the container volume as a characteristic.
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Table 3. Market goods and characteristics
Market goods Characteristics
Conventional milk, 3.5% fat Milkiness
Conventional milk, 1.5% fat Fat content
Conventional milk, 0.1% fat Organic
Organic milk, 3.5% fat
Organic milk, 1.5% fat
Organic milk, 0.1% fat
K = 6 J = 3
The transformation matrix is given by:
A =
26666664
1 3:5 0
1 1:5 0
1 0:1 0
1 3:5 1
1 1:5 1
1 0:1 1
37777775
The rst characteristic is is the baseline characteristic common to all milk 
we have termed it milkiness (the combination of water, calcium, particular
vitamins etc. that are common to all milks) and it is measured in litres. If a
consumer were to buy one litre of completely fat free, conventionally produced
milk (were such a product available in this market) this is the characteristic
they would consume. Fat content is measured in centilitres per liter and is
linear with respect to market goods: a litre of skimmed and a litre of semi-
skimmed together produce 1:6 cls of fat by volume12 . The interpretation of the
organic/conventional characteristic is less straightforward. It is measured by an
indicator taking the value 1 if the milk is produced under organic conditions, and
0 otherwise. Whatever the organic characteristic represents (perhaps a warm
glow, perhaps the absence of antibiotic residues in the milk) this specication
of the technology says that twice as much of it is produced by buying 2 litres
of milk, than is produced by 1 litre; which is not to say, however, that the
consumer then values it twice as much since the utility function is concave in
attributes.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Missing prices.
In these data we can only construct unit prices for the purchases which take
place. As already discussed, the two options to deal with this are either to
impute prices and apply the test described in Theorem 1 or to apply the weaker
test in Theorem 2 which only requires the observed prices. We present the results
12A less restrictive characteristics model would allow for di¤erences in the taste of milk
according to the fat content. In that case full fat is not simply a linear combination of skimmed
and semi-skimmed and we would have four characteristics (skimmed, semi-skimmed, full-fat
and organic) rather than the three we have taken. Other more exotic mappings from market
goods to characteristics are clearly conceivable but we are interested in seeing how well this
very simple approach does in explaining the data.
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for both tests beginning with the weaker test (since if a household fails this
then they obviously cannot satisfy Theorem 1 however we were to impute the
missing prices). For households satisfying the conditions we present the marginal
valuations of characteristics we are able to recover using our methods. We
then impute the missing prices using region/month cell medians from observed
unit prices and re-test applying the conditions in Theorem 1. Note that in
carrying out these test we consider each household separately so that we allow
for complete heterogeneity amongst households. This is with respect to whether
or not an individual households behaviour is z-rationalisable at all; the form of
their preferences if they indeed are rationalisable and their marginal valuations
of the characteristics.
To begin with we take the time series of price and quantity data for an
individual household and the 3-factor technology matrix and apply phase one
of the linear programme dened by condition (L) in Theorem 2. We record
whether a feasible solution exists. We then take the data for the next household
and repeat the exercise. We also apply the test of q-rationalisation in which we
replace A with an IK matrix. The results are given in Table 4.
Table 4. Test results, with missing prices
q-rationalisation z -rationalisation
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Pass 2341 94% 1891 76%
Fail 159 6% 609 24%
Total 2500 100% 2500 100%
We nd that for the great majority of the sample households there exist suitable
virtual prices and utility functions which q-rationalise their observed behaviour.
We also nd that for three-quarters of the sample (and 81% of those who are
q-rationalisable) behaviour is also z -rationalisable.
We also investigate whether we can explain the pattern of passing/failure
using some of the observable characteristics of the survey households. The con-
trols were: dummy variables for single person households, households composed
of couples, the presence of children, the presence of pre-school age children, the
main shopper being male, the presence of retired people and living in Copen-
hagen and continuous variables for the total volume of milk purchased by the
household and the mean age of the adults in the household. In a linear regres-
sion of a q-rationalisability indicator on these variables and a constant, only the
male shopper dummy was signicant (positively). For the same regression for
z-rationalisability the dummies for single person households, retired household
members and the purchase volume were all positively signicant. The pre-school
children dummy was negatively signicant. However, the overall ability of these
control variables to t the patterns of passes and failure in the data was very
weak. The R2 of linear regressions of q-rationalisability and z-rationalisability
indicators on these controls were 0:0075 and 0:032 respectively. We conclude
that the patterns of passes/failures is largely unexplained by observables.
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Figure 2: The distributions of marginal valuations of
characteristics.
The linear programme test only indicates the existence of Afriat numbers
and vectors of marginal valuations of characteristics which satisfy the conditions
for the model; it does not recover them uniquely. However, for many households
which are rationalisable we are able to recover unique solutions for the -vectors.
For these households (1385 in all) we solve for t in each period where a solution
can be obtained13 . Table 6 reports some descriptive statistics for the marginal
valuations of each characteristic, and Figure 2 illustrates their sample densities.
It is most important to note that these are no longer representative of the
population since they are highly selected. For example, a household that only
ever buys one type of milk will not have a unique shadow prices and consequently
is not represented in these samples. To fully characterise the joint distributions
of tastes would require partial identication methods and would produce bounds
rather than point estimates.
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of recovered marginal valuations, DKK
Percentile Points
Mean Std Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th n
Milkiness 5.10 1.24 3.53 4.80 5.07 5.56 6.27 6829
Fat 0.43 0.59 0.00 0.19 0.32 0.56 1.16 4965
Organic 0.99 1.26 -0.63 0.46 1.20 1.53 2.72 3121
On average, milkiness has a valuation of 5.10 DKK per litre with each additional
cl of fat content increasing the valuation by 0.43 DKK and organic attracting a
premium of about 1 DKK. The valuations of the milkiness and the organic char-
acteristic are evidently highly heterogeneous, whilst the valuations of fat are less
so. Milkiness always has a positive marginal valuation but there are some nega-
tive valuations for the other characteristics: just under 10% of valuations of fat
13Note that we may not be able to solve for all of the elements of t in every case as this
will depend on the standard rank/order requirements for the simultaneous equation systems
p+t = A
+
t t.
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recovered are negative and nearly 17% of organic are negative. These negative
marginal valuations do not conict with the theory and are not inconsistent with
the idea that the consumption of market goods has non-negative marginal util-
ity overall. For some households which buy a su¢ ciently wide range of goods we
are able simultaneously to recover their valuations of all of the characteristics.
Figure 3: The joint distribution of the marginal
valuations of fat and organic.
Two dimensions (fat,organic) are illustrated in Figure 3; note that once again
a household may appear several times in this distribution. There appear to be
three distinct modes: one small group (top left) shows a high fat valuation and
a low valuation for organic; a larger group (top right) has a high valuation of
organic and a moderate one for fat; a large middle group which values organic
but not fat. It seems that households are fairly stable with respect to which
of these groups they principally belong with 77% of households appearing in
only one of these groups, 20% appearing in two groups (most often the big low
fat-moderate organic and the top right moderate fat-moderate organic groups)
and only 3% of households having valuations which appear in all three.
4.2.2 Imputed prices.
We now impute the missing prices using the medians of region/time period cells
and test for q-rationalisation and z-rationalisation using Theorem 1. With the
missing data lled in in this manner, we rst test (using Afriats Theorem) for
q-rationalisation for each individual household to see whether there exists an
admissible utility function u (q) dened over products which rationalises their
behaviour. For those that fail we know that z-rationalisation is out of the
question. For those where a suitable u (q) exists we apply the conditions in
Theorem 1.
Table 8. Test results, with imputed prices
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q-rationalisation z -rationalisation
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Pass 1766 71% 1498 60%
Fail 734 29% 1002 40%
Total 2500 100% 2500 100%
Using the imputed prices, 71% of the sample are q-rationalisable: the rest are
not and since (taking the imputed prices to be correct) q-rationalisation is a
necessary condition for z-rationalisation, these households cannot satisfy the
conditions in Theorem 1. Setting them aside we then test the remaining 1766
households. We nd that, using the imputed prices, 60% of the sample are z-
rationalisable (this represents 84% of those who satisfy the prerequisite of being
q-rationalisable). As before, we examined the ability of observable household
characteristics to predict the pattern of passes/failures in the data. Once more,
though individual controls were statistically signicant14 the overall R2 for q-
rationalisability and z-rationalisability were extremely low: 0:0402 and 0:0325
respectively. Once more we conclude that the pattern of passes/failures is es-
sentially random with respect to household observables.
5 Conclusions
We have extended revealed preference methods to the analysis of consumer char-
acteristics models. We have derived the necessary and su¢ cient empirical condi-
tions under which data on the market behaviour of heterogeneous, price-taking,
individual consumers are nonparametrically consistent with the consumer char-
acteristics model. We consider the case in which all prices are observed and
the case in which only the price of the purchased goods are observed. Where
these conditions hold, we show how information may be recovered on individual
consumers marginal valuations of product attributes. Where the conditions fail
we highlight the role which the introduction of unobserved product attributes
can play in rationalising the data. We have implemented these ideas using a
consumer panel data on the Danish milk market. Specically we consider the
purchase of six milk types using a long household panel. We nd that most
households who satisfy the conventional Afriat-Varian consistency conditions
also satisfy those for a simple three characteristics model. We supply estimates
of the distribution of tastes for the three characteristics.
14 In the q-rationalisability regression the dummy variables for retired household members,
male shoppers and the purchase volume measure were all positively signicant, whilst age
was negatively related. In the z-rationalisability regression the results were the same with the
addition of the living in Copenhagen dummy variable which was negatively signicant.
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6 Appendix.
Proof of Theorem 1
(P ) ) (A) : By concavity of v (z) we have v (zs)  v (zt) +rv (zt)0 (zs   zt)
and optimising behaviour implies p0t  0tA0 with equality when qkt > 0 where
tt =rv (zt) by denition15 . Therefore we have numbers fVt; t > 0;tgt=1;:::;T
(where t > 0 follows from non-satiation with respect to market goods) which
satisfy Vs  Vt + t0t (zs   zt) for all s; t:
(A) ) (P ) : From condition (L2) we have p0tqt = 0tA0qt = 0tzt; since the
locations in pt where the prices are greater than the corresponding locations
in 0tA
0 occur only where the corresponding locations in qt are zero16 . The
linear structure, however, ensures that p0tq  0tA0q = 0tz: Hence (A2) gives
p0tqt  p0tq ) 0tzt  0tz: Condition (A1) is, by Afriats Theorem, equivalent
to the existence of a concave, continuous utility function v (z) such that for any
z with 0tzt  0tz it is the case that v (zt)  v (z) (that is to say, condition (A1)
means that there exists some v (z) which q-rationalises the data ft; ztgt=1;:::;T ).
Combining these results we have that for any z = A0q such that p0tqt  p0tq
then 0tzt  0tz and there exists a suitable utility function v (z) such that
v (zt)  v (z). Hence there exists a concave, continuous utility function v (z)
with z = A0q which z-rationalises the data fpt;qt; ztgt=1;:::;T .
(L)() (A). Given fVt; t > 0;tgt=1;:::;T which satisfy (A) we can then simply
normalise on min = mint ftgt=1;:::;T and dene Wt = Vt=min, t = t=min,
jt = t
j
t=
min. We then have fWt; t  1;tgt=1;:::;T satisfying (L) as re-
quired. Conversely, given fWt; t  1;tgt=1;:::;T satisfying (L) we can divide
(L1) to (L3) by the positive constant t and dening Vt =Wt=t; t = 
 1
t and
jt = 
j
t=t we have condition (A) :
(A)() (G) : Given some t satisfying condition (A), the equivalence between
condition (A) and GARP on the data ft;A0qtgt=1;:::;T follows from, for ex-
ample, Theorem 1 in Varian (1983) by interpreting the t vector as the price
vector for the characteristics.
Proof of Corollary 1
If there exists a function v (z) that z-rationalises fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T , then v (A0qt) 
v (A0q) for all q such that p0tqt  p0tq. Dene u (q) by u (q) = v (A0q). Then
v (A0qt)  v (A0q) for all q such that p0tqt  p0tq =)u (qt)  u (q) for all q
such that p0tqt  p0tq. Therefore u (q) q-rationalises the data. If v (A0q) is
concave then
v (A0qt) + (1  )v (A0qs) = u (qt) + (1  )u (qs)
u (qt) + (1  )u (qs)  v (A0qt + (1  )vA0qs)
But
v (A0qt + (1  )vA0qs) = v (A0 (qt + (1  )qs))
= u (qt + (1  )qs)
15Gorman (1956) p. 843.
16Linearity is over-su¢ cient in this sense as p0tqt = 0tzt would also result from z (q) being
a nonlinear homogenous of degree one function.
18
Hence v (A0qt)+(1 )v (A0qs)  u (qt + (1  )qs) =) u (q) is concave.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Obvious from comparison with Theorem 1 whilst noting that given t such that
p+t = A
+
t t for all t = 1; :::; T , then we can simply use them to construct the
unobserved prices from p0t = A
0
tt. 
Proof of Corollary 2.
Analogous to Corollary 1.
Proof of Corollary 3.
By Afriats Theorem GARP for the data fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T is equivalent to the
existence of numbers fVt; t > 0gt=1;:::;T such that
Vs  Vt + tp0t (qs   qt) for all s; t = 1; :::; T
The rank condition implies the existence of vectors ftgt=1;:::;T such that
p0t = 
0
tA
0
for all t. Substituting in means that there exists numbers fVt; t > 0gt=1;:::;T
such that
Vs  Vt + t0tA0 (qs   qt) for all s; t = 1; :::; T
Vs  Vt + t0t (A0qs  A0qt) for all s; t = 1; :::; T
The rest of the proof is analogous to that for Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Let  = [1; :::;t] be a (J  T ) matrix. Let
E
(KT )
= P
(KT )
  A
(KJ)(JT )
Then rank fEg = rank(A s P)   rank(A)  rank(A s P)   rank(A) =
H. Assume  is chosen so that rank fEg = H. Thus E can be written
as BB where B is a K  H matrix that forms a column basis for E and
B =
 
BB0
 1
BE. So
P = [A s B]


B

and rank
neA s Po = rankneAo where eA is the augmented A matrix. Given
this rank condition and the fact that fpt;qtgt=1;:::;T is q-rationalisable Corollary
1 then applies. Since rank fEg can never be less than H, B must always add
at least H characteristics to the model. 
Proof of Theorem 4
If f (B) = 0 then emax(;Z) = 1 since emax(;Z) 2 [0; 1] and by denition
(see the discussion of this function in the Appendix) the data ft; ztgt=1;:::;T
satisfy condition (G) and therefore conditions (A) and (L) in Theorem 1 and
their equivalents in Theorem 2.
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The Afriat e¢ ciency function.
A GARP test can be interpreted as a test of two sub-hypotheses: (1) the con-
sumer has rational preferences, and (2) the consumer is an e¢ cient programmer.
If the data violates GARP then Afriat (1973) suggests modifying (2) whilst
maintaining (1). He suggests a form of partial e¢ ciency, and introduces the
e¢ ciency parameter e where 0  e  1. The consumer is now allowed to waste
a fraction (1  e) of their budget through optimisation error. This is done by
modifying the preference relation R0 to:
qsR
0
eqt , ep0sqs  p0sqt
This e¢ ciency concept can be used to dene a weaker consistency test:
GARP (e) : qsReqt ) Not qtP 0e qs
where Not qtP 0e qs  ep0tqt  0tqs and where Re denotes the transitive
closure of R0e. If e = 1 then GARP (e) is equivalent to GARP . If e = 0 then
there is no restriction on behaviour. The function e () is a simple numerical
search algorithm with nds the largest value of e such that a given data set
satises GARP (e).
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